Provo City Corporation, a municipal coporation v. Rulon duaneWilden : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
Provo City Corporation, a municipal coporation v.
Rulon duaneWilden : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
W. Andrew McCullough; MuCullough, Jones, Jensen & Ivins; Attorneys for Appellant.
Vernon F. (Rick) Romney; Provo City Attorney\'s Office; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Provo City Corp v. Wilden, No. 198620983.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1482
BRIEF 
A*3wtt*. THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PRCVO CITY CORPORATION, ) 




vs. ) Case No, 1(0,983 





BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from a judgment of the Fourth Jtiditiial 
District Court for Utah County, the Honorable nayid 
Sam, affirming defendant's conviction fjor 
solicitation of a sex act, which conflation was-
rendered by the Eighth Circuit Court, Provo 
Depar-ment, the Honorable J. Gordon Knudsen, 
presiding.-
VERNON F. (RltK) ROMNEY 
Provo City At£orjnjey' s 
Office 
P.O. Box 1$49 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Attorney f'or Itasjpondent 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH 
MuCullough, Jones, Jensen & Ivins 
930 South State Street. Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 F! 
Attorneys for Appellant 
IM131M 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RULON DUANE WILDENf 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20,983 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from a judgment of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court for Utah County, the Honorable David 
Sam, affirming defendant's conviction for 
solicitation of a sex act, which conviction was 
rendered by the Eighth Circuit Court, Provo 
Department, the Honorable J. Gordon Knudsen, 
presiding. 
VERNON F. (RICK) ROMNEY 
Provo City Attorney's 
Office 
P.O. Box 1849 • 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Attorney for Respondent 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH 
MuCullough, Jones, Jensen & Ivins 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Attorneys for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND ORDINANCES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 7 
POINT ONE: DEFENDANT LACKS STANDING TO 
ATTACK THE PROVO ORDINANCE IN 
QUESTION AS OVERBROAD SINCE HIS 
CONDUCT WAS OF THAT TYPE WHICH 
MAY BE PUNISHED DESPITE THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 7 
POINT TWO: CASES CITED BY DEFENDANT IN HIS 
BRIEF SUPPORT THE PROPOSITION 
THAT SPEECH CAN BE PREVENTED WHEN 
IT ADVOCATES CRIMINAL ACTIVITY . . . 23 
CONCLUSION 25 
CASES CITED 
American Communications Association v. Douds, 
339 U.S. 382 (1950) 8 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 
601 (1973) 3, 11, 12, 13 ,19 
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 
442 U.S. 140 (1979) 12 
Ellis v. Social Services Dept., etc., 
615 P.2d 1250 (Utah, 1980) 15 
Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah, 1974) . . . 15 
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) . . . 12, 17 
-i-
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) . . . . . . . 14 
People ex rel City of Arvada v. Nissen, 
650 P.2d 547 (Colo., 1982) 21 
People v. Weeks, 591 P.2d 91 
(Colo., 1979) . 18, 19, 20 
Pryor v. Municipal Court for Los Angeles, 
599 P.2d 636 (Cal., 1979) 24 
Salt Lake City v. Piepenburg, 
571 P.2d 1299 (Utah, 1977) 16 
Salt Lake City v. West Gallery Corporation, 
584 P.2d 839 (Utah, 1978) 16 
Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah, 1961) . . 10, 11 
State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837 (Utah, 1978) . . . . . 9 
State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280 (Utah, 1983) . 17, 18 
State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936 (Utah, 1975) . 15, 16 
State v. Tusek, 630 P.d 892 (Ore.App., 1981 . 23, 24 
State v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677 (Utah, 1984) . . . . 15 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED 
Amendment I, Constitution of the United States . . 6 
ORDINANCES CITED 
Section 12.45.010 Revised Ordinances of 
Provo City 1,2,3,6 
Section 12.45.020(16) Revised Ordinances 
of Provo City „ 2 
Section 76-7-103 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) , as amended 9 
Section 76-7-104 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) , as amended 9 
-ii-
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth 
Doctrine, 83 Harvard L.Rev. 844 (1970) . . 14, 18 
Clark and Marshall, Law of Crimes 
(7th Ed. 1967) 7 
-iii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RULON DUANE WILDEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20,983 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Defendant claims section 12.45.010 of the 
Revised Ordinances of Provo City is facially 
overbroad and therefore unconstitutional. Plaintiff 
asserts that the ordinance is constitutionally 
sound, and that defendant's actions fall completely 
within the conduct regulated by the ordinance. 
Further, plaintiff asserts that defendant has no 
standing to attack the ordinance since his own 
rights of free expression were not violated by the 
ordinance, and since this Court would of necessity 
need to speculate to predict whether the prosecution 
of the defendant under the ordinance would cause 
others to refrain from constitutionally protected 
speech because of a fear of subsequent prosecution 
under the same statute. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ORDINANCE PROVISIONS 
Section 12.45.010 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Provo City states: 
Section 12.45.010 Unlawful Sex Acts, 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, 
in public or in a public place, to exhibit 
or expose his or her genitals, or to engage 
in, or to solicit another to engage in, any 
sexual conduct as defined herein. 
(b) "Sexual conduct" means human 
masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any 
touching of the covered or uncovered 
genitals, human female breast, pubic areas 
or buttocks of the human male or female, 
whether alone or between members of the 
same or opposite sex or between humans and 
animals, in an act of apparent sexual 
stimulation or gratification, which terms 
shall include, but not be limited to 
fellatio, cunnilingus, pederasty and 
bestiality. 
Section 12.44.020(16) defines "public place: as: 
A place accessible or visible to members 
of the public or to casual passersby; or 
any place where a fee or charge is made for 
entrance or membership. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was convicted by the Eighth Circuit 
Court, Provo Department, the Honorable J. Gordon 
-2-
Knudsen presiding, on May 16f 1986, of solicitation 
of a sex act, in violation of Section 12.45.010 of 
the Revised Ordinances of Provo City. 
Defendant appealed his conviction to the 
Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County. The 
Court, Honorable David Sam presiding, affirmed the 
conviction of defendant, finding that defendant's 
actions fell squarely within conduct regulated under 
Section 12.45.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Provo 
City, and finding the Provo ordinance constitution-
ally sound. The Court additionally determined that 
defendant lacked standing to attack the constitu-
tionality of the ordinance for vagueness or 
overbreadth, in accordance with the general rule 
enunciated in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 
(1973) that a litigant to whom a statute may 
constitutionally be applied will not be heard to 
challenge the statute on the ground that it may 
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to 
situations not before the Court. The Court further 
found no evidence in defendant's case to compel 
allowance to this general rule, since such excep-
tions are employed sparingly and only as a last 
resort. 
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By stipulation of the parties, testimony was 
proffered at the time of trial on May 16f 1985 that 
there were notes found in a public restroom inviting 
others to call if they desired homosexual contact. 
All the notes contained the following written 
information: 
Any Night . . . ALL NIGHT 
After 8:30 p.m. 
375-0749 Chuck 
Like Funloving Guys 
With Big Tools 
Others OK 
Also Weekdays 
12:00 noon to 5:00 p.m. 
Hikers • . • Truckers * . . Travelers 
Written on one of the notes, exhibit #3f in 
the court below, were the statements: "like hot 
young studs," "ages 18 to 40," "Black OK," "OK two 
guys," "Like tall dudes 8" or more." 
Handwritten on exhibit 1 were the following 
phrases: "Love those hot studs from Delta—where 
are all the hots studs in this valley???," "Arrange 
-4-
for me to get with some hot stud age 18 to 40 with a 
big thick 8" or more and I will make it worth your 
time—extra $ if he is a redhead or a black—how 
about it?" "This is on the level." 
Exhibit 2 also contained the following 
statements in writing on its face: "Like to be rear 
ended," "OK to stay all night," "Let's get it on," 
"There are none too big." 
A Provo police officer, in fact, called the 
telphone number listed on the notes, responding to 
the solicitation invited by the notes. The phone 
was answered by the defendant. After reading the 
note to the defendant, the officer inquired if the 
defendant left the note. The defendant then 
inquired if the officer was interested in the 
conduct offered and the defendant made arrangements 
to meet with the officer at the defendant's house. 
The defendant was arrested for soliciting in order 
to engage in sexual conduct as proscribed by the 
statute. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Solicitation, long recognized as part of the 
common law, is a distinct crime in and of itself, in 
which the prohibited act is the defendant's effort 
-5-
to move another to commit a criminal offense• 
Solicitation to a criminal act has never been held 
to be within the protection of the freedom of speech 
allowed by the First Amendment* Utah does 
statutorily prohibit consensual sexual relations 
between adults not married to each other, and public 
solicitation to engage in such relations is itself 
criminal, properly proscribable under Section 
12.45.010, Revised Ordinances of Provo City. 
Defendants conduct falls squarely within 
those activities prohibited by Section 12.45.010, 
Revised Ordinances of Provo City. He therefore 
cannot be heard to claim that the ordinance is 
constitutionally infirm as applied to him, or that 
it is facially overbroad, since the United States 
Supreme Court, this court, and courts of other 
jurisdictions do not allow facial overbreath 
challenges to ordinances to succeed at the request 
of defendants whose own conduct may be punished 




DEFENDANT LACKS STANDING TO ATTACK THE 
PROVO ORDINANCE IN QUESTION AS OVERBROAD 
SINCE HIS CONDUCT WAS OF THAT TYPE WHICH 
MAY BE PUNISHED DESPITE THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
Defendant attempts to make much of his claim 
that the statute at issue in this case is an 
unconstitutional violation of the right of free 
speech on its face, and should be declared such by 
this Court. Apparently, a portion of defendant's 
argument is that all he did was to utter words and 
communicate thoughts—conduct which no criminal law 
may constitutionally abridge. The problem with this 
argument, however, is that appellant reads the 
freedom of speech clause too broadly, since various 
forms of speech have long been held to be without 
the protective umbrella of the First Amendment, 
including speech which constitutes solicitation to a 
criminal act. 
Solicitation is recognized in the United 
States as a part of Anglo-American common law. In 
Clark and Marshall, Law of Crimes (7th Ed. 1967), 
its characteristics are well set out, at 219-223: 
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Solicitation is a distinct common-law 
misdemeanor in which the act forbidden 
consists of the accused person's parol or 
written efforts to activate another to 
commit a criminal offense. It is 
immaterial whether the solicitation is of 
any effect and whether the crime 
solicited is in fact committed . . . 
The gist of this offense is 
incitement. In brief, the gravamen of 
this common-law misdemeanor lay in 
counselingf enticing, or inducing another 
to commit a crime . . . 
Inciting or soliciting another to 
commit a crime is the act of the least 
magnitude which is punishable by the 
common law. In such offenses the actor 
does nothing himself but he urges others 
to violate the law. The necessity for 
punishing such persons is obvious, and 
such conduct is generally punished as a 
substantive crime, notwithstanding the 
solicitation does not move the party 
solicited to commit the offense. 
The crime of solicitation punishes more than 
mere words. Solicitation is an act. Even 
acknowledging the broad social purposes behind the 
First Amendment, those purposes do not extend the 
protection of that amendment to verbal acts which 
solicit criminal conduct. The words of the Supreme 
Court in American Communications Association vs. 
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) , are appropriates 
Although the First Amendment provides 
that Congress shall make no law abridging 
the freedom of speech, press or assembly, 
-8-
it has long been established that those 
freedoms themselves are dependent upon 
the power of constitutional government to 
survive. If it is to survive it must 
have power to protect itself against 
unlawful conduct and under some 
circumstances, against incitements to 
commit unlawful acts. Freedom of speech 
thus does not comprehend the right to 
speak on any subject at any time. 
339 U.S. at 394. 
As defendant in the instant case concedes, 
Utah does statutorily prohibit consensual sexual 
relations between two adults in private, under the 
adultery and fornication provisions of sections 
76-7-103 and 104, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended. Additionally, this Court, in State v. 
Haig, 578 P.2d 837 (Utah, 1978), upheld the 
constitutionality of the definition of "sexual 
conduct" included in the state pornography statute, 
which definition is almost identical to the 
definition of "sexual conduct" in the Provo City 
ordinance here challenged by defendant. 
Therefore, whatever the constitutional 
protection surrounding private consensual sexual 
acts between married couples might be, that 
protection should not extend to one not in that 
category. The right of privacy of the marital union 
should not be extended to strike down a statute 
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proscribing engaging in public in acts of 
cunnilingus, fellatio, and the whole field of other 
unnatural or perverted sexual practice, or the 
public solicitation to engage in such acts. This is 
so particularly because successful prosecutions of 
private consensual sexual acts between married 
couples are at most only conceivable. Such 
extension of the marital right of privacy is not 
consistent with the description of the marriage 
relationship and right of privacy described by 
Justice Douglas. If consummated crimes themselves 
are constitutional in terms of their criminality, 
then constitutionality follows as to their incipient 
or inchoate phases, which definitely includes the 
public solication to engage in such conduct. 
The defendant calls attention to the case of 
Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah, 1961), in which 
a married woman filed a tort action against the 
defendant claiming severe emotional distress because 
of defendants persistent proposal that she have 
illicit sexual relations with him. The lower court 
dismissed the action, and on appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the complaint stated a cause 
of action even though no other overt tort was 
complained of. In the course of the decision, the 
-10-
Court stated that under usual circumstances, 
solicitation to sexual intercourse would not be 
actionable in tort, even though it may be offensive 
to the offeree. However, the harm sought to be 
remedied in Samms, supra, was compensable civil 
wrong, instead of criminal wrong, and so appellant's 
citation of and discussion of the Samms case is 
inapplicable to the instant facts. 
The general rule governing the standing of a 
party to challenge the constitutionality of 
legislation is that a litigant to whom a statute may 
constitutionally be applied will not be heard to 
challenge the statute on the ground that it may 
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others 
in situations not before the court. Brodrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). However, the United 
States Supreme Court has recognized a limited 
exception to this rule, under which litigants are 
permitted to challenge a statute not only because 
their own rights of free expression are violated, 
but also because of a judicial prediction or 
assumption that the statute's very existence may 
cause others not before the court to refrain from 
constitutionally protected speech or expression. 
Brodrick, supra. 
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However, this exception to the general rule of 
standing is to be employed rarely, as noted by the 
followinq language in Broadrick; 
Application of the overbreadth doctrine 
in this manner is, manifestly, strong 
medicine. It has been employed by the 
Court sparingly and only as a last resort. 
413 U.S. 613. 
The United States Supreme Court has followed 
Broadrick in subsequent cases, in determining 
standing of a party to challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute. In County Court of 
Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979) the 
Court determined that; 
A party has standing to challenge the 
constitutuionality of a statute only 
insofar as it has an adverse impact on 
his own rights. As a general rule, if 
there is no constitutional defect in the 
application of the statute to a litigant, 
he does not have standing to argue that 
it would be unconstitutional if applied 
to third parties in hypothetical 
situations. Brodrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2914, 37 
L.Ed.2d 830 (and cases cited). A limited 
exception has been recognized for 
statutes that broadly prohibit speech 
protected by the First Amendment. Id, at 
611-616, 93 S.Ct., at 2915-2918. This 
exception has been justified by the 
overriding interest in removing illegal 
deterrents to the exercise of the right 
of free speech. 
Additionally, in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747 (1982) the Court explained why the scope of the 
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First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is "strong 
medicine" to be employed with hesitation and "only 
as a last resort" as follows: 
The scope of the First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine, like most excep-
tions to established principles, must be 
carefully tied to the circumstances in 
which facial invalidation of a statute is 
truly warranted. Because of the wide-
reaching effects of striking down a 
statute on its face at the request of one 
whose own conduct may be punished despite 
the First Amendment, we have recognized 
that the overbreadth doctrine is "strong 
medicine" and have employed it with 
hesitationf and then "only as a last 
resort." Brodrick, [citation omitted]. 
We have, in consequence, insisted that 
the overbreadth involved be "substantial" 
before the statute involved will be 
invalidated on its face. 
In Broadrick, we explained the basis for 
this requirement: 
'The plain import of our cases is, at 
the very least, that facial overbreath 
adjudication is an exception to our 
traditional rules of practice and that 
its function, a limited one at the 
outset, attenuates as the otherwise 
unprotected behavior that it forbids 
the State to sanction moves from 'pure 
speech' toward conduct and that 
conduct—even if expressive — falls 
within the scope of otherwise valid 
criminal laws that reflect legitimate 
state interests in maintaining 
comprehensive controls over harmful, 
constitutionally unprotected conduct. 
Although such laws, if too broadly 
worded, may deter protected speech to 
some unknown extent, there comes a 
point where that effect—at best a 
prediction—cannot, with confidence, 
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justify invalidating a statute on its 
face and so prohibiting a State from 
enforcing the statute against conduct 
that is admittedly within its power to 
proscribe. [citations omitted]. 
We accordingly held that particularly 
where conduct and not merely speech is 
involved, we believe that the overbreadth 
of a statute must not only be real, but 
substantial as wellf judged in relation 
to the statute's plainly legitimate 
sweep.' Ibid. 
458 U.S. 769, 770 
Therefore, the United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly expressed its reluctance to strike down a 
statute on its face where there are a substantial 
number of situations to which it might be validly 
applied, even if there are marginal applications in 
which it would infringe on First Amendment values. 
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). 
The reasoning for this reluctance is explained 
as being due to the presumptions 
that only substantially overbroad laws 
set up the kind and degree of chill that, 
is judicially cognizable. Morevover, 
'without a substantial overbreadth 
limitation, review for overbreadth would 
be draconian indeed. It is difficult to 
think of a law that is utterly devoid of 
potential for unconstitutionally in some 
conceivable application.' 
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 
Harvard L.Rev. 844, at 859 (1970). 
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This Court has followed the lead of the United 
States Supreme Court endowing legislative enactments 
with a strong presumption of validity. 
In Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah, 
1974), this Court held that the then-challenged 
statute, making it unlawful for a person with a 
blood alcohol content of .10 percent or greater to 
drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
was not void for vagueness, and that the defendant 
was not in a position to complain that the statute 
was unconstitutional because it might punish 
innocent conduct. This Court held that legislative 
enactments are endowed with strong presumptions of 
validity and should not be declared unconstitutional 
if there is any reasonable basis upon which they can 
be found to come within a constitutional framework. 
Legislative enactments, this Court opined, will not 
be stricken down as being unconstitutional unless 
they appear to be so beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
also Ellis v. Social Service Dept., etc., 615 P.2d 
1250 (Utah, 1980); State v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677 
(Utah, 1982), Justice Oaks1 concurring opinion. 
This Court in State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936 
(Utah, 1975), held that the statute proscribing the 
-15-
distribution of pornographic material, challenged by 
the defendants, was valid* The Court also held that 
no one should be entitled to challenge a statute and 
have it declared void because it may unjustly affect 
someone else, where his own rights are not adversely 
affected. The defendant in Phillips did not deny 
that the exhibits in evidence were anything other 
than the rawest of obscenities, and so he could not, 
according to the Court, be adversely affected "by 
the twilight zones if any such did exist in this 
statute," 540 P.2d at 940. 
This Court has recognized that a convicted 
defendant, in First Amendment cases, may attack the 
statute under which he is convicted as overbroad, 
but, just as importantly, has also repeatedly held 
that there is strong judicial reluctance to declare 
a statute facially unconstitutional when it is only 
in the abstract that the ordinance might be thought 
of as adversely affecting someone else in different 
circumstances. Salt Lake City v. Piepenburg, 571 
P.2d 1299 (Utah, 1977); Salt Lake City v. West 
Gallery Corporation, 584 P.2d 839 (Utah, 1978). 
Defendant was, as determined by Judge Sam in 
the decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court 
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below, convicted under a constitutionally sound 
ordinance for conduct falling squarely within the 
conduct regulated by the ordinance. The fact that 
he can hypothesize that the ordinance might 
adversely affect someone else in different 
circumstances will not redound advantageously to him 
and to his claim that the ordinance is facially 
overbroad. 
This Court in State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280 
(Utah, 1983) adopted the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court in New York v. Ferber, supra, that the strong 
medicine of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine 
must be tied carefully to circumstances in which 
facial invalidation of a statute is truly warranted 
because of the wide-reaching effects of striking 
down a statute on its face at the request of one 
whose conduct may be punished despite the First 
Amendment. The "strong medicine" of the overbreadth 
doctrine is employed by this court also with 
hesitation and only as a last resort. The Court 
noted in Jordan that the alleged overbroad language 
in the statute there challenged could be narrowly 
construed, given the context in which it appeared, 
so that there was no need for an adjudication of 
-17-
hypothetical claims not before the Court. As the 
Jordan Court suggested, in adopting a metaphors 
"When a line of excision is available, one standing 
within the zone which a truncated statute might 
reach may be barred from setting up the statute's 
overbreadth as to others." Note, the First 
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harvard L. Rev. 
844, 909 (1970) . 
Incorporating the foregoing principles, the 
Colorado Supreme Court in the case of People v. 
Weeks, 591 P.2d 91 (Colo., 1979), reversed and 
remanded to the lower court the order of the 
district court dismissing five counts of an 
information charging violations of a statute 
proscribing telephone harassment. The Colorado 
court held that the statute was not unconstitution-
ally vague with respect to the prosecution of a 
defendant who made telephone calls laced with sexual 
suggestions and descriptions of sex acts. The court 
also held that the defendant had no standing to 
attack such a statute on overbreadth grounds. The 
Court held that: 
. . . the doctrine of overbreadth is used 
sparingly, because a statute which has 
been found overbroad may not be used as 
-18-
the basis for prosecution in any case. 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra. Thus, use 
of the doctrine is reserved for those 
defendants whose speech is at the fringes 
of that activity which the statute is 
designed to regulate. Those defendants 
whose speech is central to the interests 
which the statute seeks to protect and is 
clearly of a type regulated by the 
statute in question, cannot attack the 
statute as overbroad. They must 
demonstrate that the statute is 
unconstitutional as applied to them. 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra; Bolles v. 
People, 541 P.2d 80 (Colo., 1975). 
Defendant has posed several ingenious 
examples of constitutionally protected 
communications which could result in 
prosecution under [the statute in 
question]. But defendant did not engage 
in any activity of that nature. Instead, 
his telephone calls are at the core of 
the privacy interests which [the Colorado 
Code Section] is designed to protect. 
This court would necessarily have to 
speculate to predict whether a 
prosecution of defendant under [this 
section] for his speech in this case 
would cause others who might wish to 
engage in constitutionally protected 
activity to refrain from speaking because 
of a fear of subsequent prosecution under 
that same statute. Thus, the defendant 
may not employ the doctrine of 
overbreadth to strike down the statute 
with which he is charged. Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, supra, 413 U.S. at 615. 
591 P.2d at 94, 95. 
It cannot be controverted that in the instant 
case, just as in Weeks, supra, the defendant's 
speech, which consisted in the content of the notes 
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found in public restrooms, and his conduct 
associated with that speech, which consisted in 
placing those notes in public restrooms, is central 
to the interest which the statute seeks to protect 
and is clearly of a type regulated by the statute in 
question. The statute clearly prohibits 
solicitation of homosexual conduct, which homosexual 
conduct was precisely what was being solicited by 
defendant in this case. 
Also, as in Weeks, supra, the defendant has 
posed several ingenious examples of constitutionally 
protected communications which could result in 
prosecution under the ordinance here questioned. He 
states, for instance, that the Provo ordinance would 
prohibit a married person from making to his spouse, 
a suggestion of sexual conduct to be engaged in at a 
time when the married couple arrives at their home* 
He also disingenuously suggests that the Provo City 
ordinance would prohibit members of local sports 
teams from patting each other on the human buttocks 
after a particularly good play. 
Since this court would, as did the court in 
Weeks, supra, necessarily need to speculate to 
-20-
predict whether the prosecution of the defendant 
under the Provo City ordinance for his speech would 
cause others who might wish to engage in constitu-
tionally protected activity to refrain from speaking 
because of a fear of subsequent prosection under 
this same statute, the defendant may not employ the 
doctrine of overbreadth to strike down the statute 
with which he is charged. 
In People ex rel City of Arvada v. Nissen, 650 
P.2d 547 (Colo.f 1982), the Supreme Court of 
Colorado granted certiorari to review a decision of 
the lower court which decision affirmed a judgment 
of dismissal in a prosecution for violating a 
municipal ordinance proscribing the offense of 
battery. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the 
decision of the lower court and remanded to the 
lower court the case for redetermination. The 
defendant in Nissen, supra, claimed that the statute 
was overbroad since it did not expressly limit 
battery to contacts which were neither privileged 
nor consensual, including athletics and spanking of 
children. The Colorado Court determined that if a 
challenged ordinance lends itself to alternate 
constructions, one of which is constitutional, the 
-21-
constitutional interpretation must be adopted. The 
Court also determined that it must bear in mind that 
due process of law has never required mathematical 
exactitude in legislative draftsmanship, and that 
while an ordinance must be sufficiently specific to 
give fair warning of the proscribed conduct, it also 
often must remain sufficiently general to be capable 
of application under varied circumstances• In sum, 
the court determined that the battery ordinance was 
not unconstitutionally vague nor was it void for 
failure to require a sufficient amount of force to 
cause injury, nor did it encompass privileged or 
consensual contacts within its proscription. 
The Provo City ordinance challenged by 
defendant lends itself to a constitutional 
construction, as established by the decision of the 
Fourth District Court. The Court found that the 
ordinance is constitutionally sound, and that 
defendant was convicted of conduct properly 
prohibited under the explicit terms of the ordinance. 
Since defendant's conduct falls squarely and 
clearly within the core of the ordinance's 
prohibitions, any uncertainty about alleged 
imprecision of the outermost boundaries of the 
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ordinance has little relevance. Since the ordinance 
presents no potential for vagueness or overbreadth 
as applied to defendant in the particular case here 
reviewed, it is the duty of this Court to construe 
the ordinance in a way which avoids problems of 
constitutionality. 
There can be no question whatsoever that 
defendant's conduct is illegal and proscribable 
under the Provo statute, and the fact that defendant 
can hypothesize that in the abstract the ordinance 
might adversely affect someone else in different 
circumstances cannot and should not inure to 
defendant's advantage. 
POINT TWO 
CASES CITED BY DEFENDANT IN HIS BRIEF 
SUPPORT THE PROPOSITION THAT SPEECH CAN 
BE PREVENTED WHEN IT ADVOCATES CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITY. 
While appellant is correct in his statement 
that a long line of federal cases indicate that 
federal prohibitions against infringement of free 
speech apply to the states, it is also well-settled 
that speech can be prevented when it advocates 
criminal activity, as appellant's speech here 
advocated such activity. 
For example, in State v. Tusek, 630 P.2d 892 
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(Ore.App., 1981) a case cited by defendant, the 
Oregon statute proscribing accosting for deviate 
purposes was declared unconstitutional as a 
violation of free speech* The Oregon court 
determined that the Oregon statute in question in 
Tusek made it a crime to ask another person to 
participate in an act which is not itself a crime, 
because since 1971, such sexual conduct as 
proscribed by the statute performed in private 
between consenting adults was not a crime in 
Oregon. As indicated above, such is not the case 
here, since Utah does in fact proscribe such sexual 
conduct as criminal. 
In Pryor v. Municipal Court for Los Angeles, 
599 Pe2d 636 (Cal. , 1979), another case cited by 
defendant, the court determined that the language of 
the statute declaring a person guilty of disorderly 
conduct who solicits anyone to engage in or who 
engages in lewd or dissolute conduct in any public 
place or in any place open to the public or exposed 
to public view was not sufficiently narrowed either 
by legislative history or judicial precedent to 
overcome the infirmity of vagueness. However, the 
court held that the judiciary bears the obligation 
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to construe enactments to give specific content to 
terms that might otherwise be unconstitutionally 
vague, even if such a course required the court to 
depart from prior precedent which fastened an 
unconstitutionally broad interpretation on the 
statute. The court did construe the statute to be 
constitutional, in applying its obligation to 
construe the enactment constitutionally, if possible. 
In the court below, Judge Sam also construed 
the Provo City ordinance challenged by defendant to 
be constitutional. This Court should also construe 
the challenged ordinance as constitutional, 
resolving all doubts in favor of its 
constitutionality. 
CONCLUSION 
Plainiff submits that there is no 
constitutional infirmity in the challenged Provo 
City ordinance, and that defendant has no standing 
to avail himself of the First Amendment overbreath 
doctrine in regard to the ordinance, since his 
conduct is squarely within that conduct properly 
prohibited by the ordinance. Plaintiff prays that 
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